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On the ﬁnancial viability of negative
emissions
Johannes Bednar1, Michael Obersteiner1 & Fabian Wagner1
Climate mitigation will have signiﬁcant impacts on government spending
necessary to ﬁnance large-scale deployment of Negative Emission Technologies
(NETs). The required expenditure might consume up to a third of general
government expenditure in advanced economies.
The Paris Agreement aims to limit global temperature increase to 2 °C above preindustrial levels
and to balance GHG sources and sinks in the second half of this century. The technical feasibility
of these targets has broadly been demonstrated by the 5th Assessment Report (AR5) of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Recent publications, however, raise con-
cerns about the broader political and economic feasibility of compatible emission trajectories,
which typically rely on large-scale deployment of Negative Emission Technologies (NETs)—a
type of pilot backstop technology that is often associated with enormous amounts of natural land
loss, stranded assets by 2100, a potentially dangerous emission overshoot level and resulting
fundamental ethical issues of intergenerational equity1–4.
Here, we argue that the ﬁnancial viability of late-century NETs has thus far not been ade-
quately addressed and show that NETs enter IPCC scenarios for the wrong (discounting), not for
the right reason (hedging uncertainties).
NETs will require public subsidies
Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) foresee large-scale late-century NETs in most AR5 2 °C
scenarios5, while being silent about potential sources of funding for an atmospheric GHG
restoration Manhattan Project. In 2060 CO2 emissions will have declined to 30% of present levels
and BECCS will have scaled up to 50% of maximum deployment (see SI D). These numbers are
13% and 85%, respectively, for the schematic intensive economy pathway of the IPCC’s Special
Report, making the fossil sector an inadequate source of funding in line with a contemporary
Polluter Pays Principle, e.g., through ear-marked tax recycling to negative emissions, already by
2060. By then cumulative emissions will have overshot the carbon budget, so that NETs remain
the only option for returning to the Paris targets. In the absence of private incentives for
atmospheric carbon removal, large-scale deployment of NETs will have to be publicly subsidized.
A ﬁrst-order estimate of the scale of government expenditures can be derived from the carbon
price and net CO2 emissions reported for most AR5 scenarios: volume times price gives rev-
enues, however, a tax on negative emissions turns into a government expenditure item.
Carbon prices increasing at rates above economic growth lead to small near-term revenues
compared to future expenditures for NETs – even when expressed as shares of GDP – as
demonstrated in Fig. 1 . At zero transaction costs of a uniform globally applicable carbon pricing
mechanism, median income reaches a maximum of 1.8% of global GDP in 2040. In 2070, it turns
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into a subsidy peaking in 2100 at 3.9% of GDP—higher than the
US’ current expenditure share for defense. Similar trends hold for
the RCP2.6 SSP6 and 400–1000 GtCO2 CD-LINKS7 scenarios,
peaking at 1.6% and 4.1% of GDP in 2100, respectively.
Cost allocation following considerations of intra- and
intergenerational effort sharing in line with the Brazilian Pro-
posal8 would lead to public spending peaking at 15% of GDP in
Annex I countries (UNFCCC) as depicted in Fig. 2, rendering the
implementation of this mechanism extremely difﬁcult (see SI B).
The US’ incomplete participation in global mitigation efforts
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Fig. 1 Public income and expenditure as GDP-percentage generated by a carbon tax on net CO2 emissions. Income/expenditure shares are derived from
net CO2 emissions, carbon price and GDP reported by AR5 scenarios compatible with the Paris agreement temperature target of 2 °C (see SI A). Positive
net emissions result in tax income which gradually turns into a subsidy as net CO2 emissions become negative with increasing deployment of Negative
Emission Technologies. The uncertainty range mainly results from different carbon price levels as consequence of diverging model characteristics and
scenario setups (e.g., choice of technology mix, carbon budget and socio-economic factors)
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Fig. 2 Income and expenditure shares for ANNEX I countries (UNFCCC) under a differentiated burden sharing arrangement. Income/expenditure shares as
GDP-percentage generated by a carbon tax on net CO2 emissions are derived from net CO2 emissions, carbon price and GDP reported by AR5 scenarios
compatible with the Paris agreement temperature target of 2 oC and redistributed taking into account historical carbon emissions (see SI A and B for
details). Tax income turns into a subsidy before mid-century which peaks at 15% of GDP in 2100. The uncertainty range mainly results from different
carbon price levels as consequence of diverging model characteristics and scenario setups (e.g., choice of technology mix, carbon budget and socio-
economic factors)
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(see SI C) could result in a subsidy of 13% by 2100 for the rest of
the world. However, such scenarios would likely be characterized
by alternative sets of optimal solutions with even higher miti-
gation costs.
Expenditure peaks in 2100
Discounting at 4–5% over 80–90-years leads to substantial Net
Present Cost (NPC) reductions if mitigation (emission reductions
and negative emissions) can be deferred—which is signiﬁcantly
ampliﬁed by NETs. Conversely, in scenarios that limit NETs
mitigation costs are incurred much earlier and are therefore
larger in present terms. For instance, limited supply of bioenergy
(BE) or Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) leads to net present
mitigation costs 64% and 138% above corresponding levels in
scenarios with unlimited amount of BECCS9. In contrast, limited
solar/wind or nuclear energy results in only 6–7% cost increase.
In IAMs, mitigation costs are reﬂected in carbon prices driven by
the level of ambition (1.5 oC versus 2 oC), or by technological or
socio-economic challenges hindering mitigation. They emerge
from explicit endogenous or exogenous carbon pricing instru-
ments, or from shadow prices of emission budget constraints. In
the latter case they reﬂect the marginal increase of the objective
function when tightening the carbon budget for an inﬁnitesimal
unit. Since costs are discounted in the objective function, the
shadow price increases with the discount rate to obtain the car-
bon price over time. Due to discounting, NETs and carbon prices
typically peak in 2100 resulting in a subsidy borne by a global
society much richer than today. However, since economic growth
is projected below the discount rate, expenditure shares are
bound to increase even under constant levels of negative
emissions.
Discussion
A carbon tax is one possible instrument for the achievement of
emission constraints in models which are silent about alternative
economic and political mechanisms. Our legitimate interpreta-
tion of the carbon price as subsidy is, however, different from the
costs of NET projects that generate a rent under inﬂated price
levels resulting from deployment obstacles (e.g., limited deploy-
ment growth rates or absolute caps). In perfect foresight/inter-
temporal optimization such rents are only positive over the whole
planning horizon. Conversely, myopic/recursive dynamic models
are characterized by a separate optimization (and shadow price)
in each time step, possibly offering a more accurate reﬂection of
marginal costs of emission reductions. Prices are therefore to
some degree artiﬁcial and depend on the speciﬁc model imple-
mentation. However, a real NET subsidy will also have to con-
sider rents to attract the required investments, even though this
might be seen as loss to society.
We considered subsidies for negative emissions (provided by
the energy and land use sectors) partly being compensated by
other sectors (especially industry and transport). Full tax recy-
cling will, however, be limited by distributional considerations.
Additional contributions from taxation of non-CO2 GHG-
emissions resulting from our agricultural practices, demography
and dietary patterns10 were not considered, given welfare aspects
of increased agricultural commodity prices notably in developing
regions11 and the size of the agricultural sector, currently gen-
erating value added of about 3.5% of global GDP12.
Cost optimizing IAMs have not succeeded in generating
robust mitigation strategies addressing technological and cli-
matic uncertainties. Instead of leading to careful improvement of
existing strategies, the implementation of additional, indepen-
dently scalable technologies (e.g., Solar Radiation Management
or Direct Air Capture) can lead to signiﬁcant NPC reductions
and cause radical shifts of mitigation action further towards
2100. In contrast to the initial purpose of NETs to manage cli-
mate risk13, as well-timed cost-saving options they tend to
increase risk considering the growing evidence of negative
impacts potentially following an emission overshoot. Detri-
mental climate feedbacks into the economy can, moreover, lead
to higher relative subsidy levels required for their own, massive
deployment.
Conclusion and reﬂections
We arrive at three conclusions which can serve as starting points
for discussing the future role of NETs in model simulations as
well as in the political sphere: First and foremost, the current
treatment as convenient cost-optimizing measures does not take
advantage of NETs over merely zero-emission mitigation tech-
nologies, namely the potential to manage an uncertain climate.
NETs need to be recognized as tool for hedging against uncer-
tainties originating from our understanding of carbon cycle cli-
mate interactions, the participation of actors in future climate
agreements, or the effectiveness of mitigation policies. For
instance, the carbon budgets used in AR5 simulations were
approximated by a linear function from climate model calcula-
tions and ignore many of the non-linear feedbacks of the earth
system, such as permafrost thawing14. Treating these budgets as
uncertain13 provides one raison d’être for NETs. Changing their
role probably implies earlier and more radical mitigation than
current IAM simulations suggest15, including near-term devel-
opment and ramping-up of NETs to clarify the actual potential
and scaling properties of speciﬁc pilot technology-options and to
avoid their non-realization, as well as social costs and ﬁnancial
risks associated with late and massive CO2 removal.
Second, the scale of public subsidies associated with the
implementation of the dominant IPCC mitigation strategy by
means of a carbon price needs to be better understood, including
the identiﬁcation of compensatory sources of funding to mini-
mize the burden on government budgets. Signiﬁcant funds could
be collected in the near-term from carbon emitters, however, at
the cost of limiting means to address considerations of dis-
tribution or competitiveness. Hence, alternative market and non-
market-based mechanisms for incentivizing NET deployment at
the required scale will have to be developed, focusing on the
reﬁnement of tools enabling non-contemporary transfers from
present polluters to future negative emissions.
Third, discounting has a distinct timing effect on deployment
strategies in cost-minimizing IAMs as it leads to a delay of
mitigation to the last possible moment. Unlike in dynamic wel-
fare optimizing IAMs that take into account intermediate climate
responses (and typically use lower discount rates), negative
impacts of an overshoot are not part of the objective function,
resulting in a strong reliance on negative emissions. We observe
an inconsistency within AR5, which dedicates a whole chapter to
the link between discounting and ethical concepts, e.g., via the
Ramsey equation, but at the same time accepts a static discount
rate across highly diverse sets of scenarios. Given the overall
objective of identifying pathways of expedient action towards the
Paris target, the IAM modeling communities will need to
reconsider how discounting is being used in models that are rich
in technologies, poor in social objectives, and yet are used to
describe very different social realities, laid out, e.g., in the shared
socio-economic pathways.
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